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Abstract: The goal of this paper is to critically analyze some of the dubious assumptions about language and meaning
hidden in the dominant accounts of the straw man fallacy. I will argue that against the background of the resurgent
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1. Introduction
The straw man fallacy is typically defined as a misrepresentation of a discussant’s arguments, and
the resulting misattribution of their commitments, in order to easier attack and rebut them (Aikin
& Casey, 2011, 2016; Lewiński, 2011; Lewiński & Oswald, 2013; Oswald & Lewiński, 2014; de
Saussure, 2018; Schumann, Zufferey, & Oswald, 2019; Talisse & Aikin, 2006; Walton, 1996).
The basic rationale behind identifying this fallacy—thou shalt not distort thy neigbour’s position—
has been well-justified in any dialectical approach to argumentation at least since Plato’s
Euthyphro: if the meanings of the terms and sentences used are not well-defined and consistently
used by both discussants, any critical, dialectical testing of their opposing positions will turn out
to be bogus, futile, or merely verbal at best.
The goal of this paper is to critically analyze some of the assumptions about language
hidden in the dominant dialectical view on the straw man fallacy. Misrepresentation presupposes
there exists a (or even the) proper representation of what an arguer said, for instance resorting to
conventions of usage or speaker intentions. However, given the recently resurging conception of
language as an underdetermined and in-principle negotiable entity (Allott & Textor, 2012; Burgess
& Plunket, 2013; Dorr & Hawthorne, 2014; Ludlow, 2014; Plunkett, 2015; Plunkett & Sundell,
2013, 2019), the straw man seems to be part and parcel of many of the metalinguistic
disagreements we have in our ordinary argumentative practice. The paper will clean up some of
the confusions by sketching the possible criteria for distinguishing between legitimate and
illegitimate forms of metalinguistic disagreements.
To start with, is there anything scholarly to be said about the straw man? It is a term
commonly used in ordinary English, it is about argumentation, it is, arguably, a fallacy, and so
argumentation scholars are surely supposed to say something about it. But can they say something
substantive that goes beyond the ordinary, folk treatment? Perhaps I will spoil the fun now, but
my argument, while critical, will end with the conclusion that they can, and even should. Only
then will I be able to move to my second point, that of the dialectical background of the straw man,
namely, of the extent to which hard dialectical questioning can be seen as strawmanning one’s
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opponent. Does being a sharp and relentless critic—a dialectical virtue recognized since Socratic
elenchus—not violate another dialectical virtue of being charitable to one’s opponent (see esp.
Aikin & Casey, 2016)? And even if it doesn’t, how can we distinguish between harsh and even
uncomfortable, but altogether reasonable, argumentative interrogation from irrelevant nit-picking,
quibbling, or “just playing with words,” to use a common expression for dialectical exasperation?

2. Is straw man a straw concept?
My digital Oxford English Dictionary tells me under the ‘straw man’ entry that it is “an
intentionally misrepresented proposition that is set up because it is easier to defeat than an
opponent’s real argument.” A lot can be said about this definition. First, this definition is replete
with complicated words, such as “intentionally,” “proposition,” and “because.” Is straw man
committed exclusively when one advances a fishy “proposition” “because” of one’s “intention” to
more easily defeat an opponent’s argument? I don’t think so—see below for details. Second, it is
replete with very complicated words, such as “real argument” and “misrepresented.” I think we all
get the point here. There are some things we say or at least convey in our arguments—and other
things we don’t convey, let alone explicitly say. Examples abound, and these are the examples
typically given in textbooks on fallacies. Many of them are good, intelligent, even realistic
examples. But often things are not so simple. Especially, claiming that there are things such as
“real arguments” or “words which mean what they mean”—while possibly useful for introductory
pedagogical or encyclopedic purposes—is either oblivious to or iconoclastic of the entire tradition
of semantics and pragmatics. It is, then, surely something to be investigated—and, indeed, below
I will focus on just that.
However, a third notable feature of the Oxford English Dictionary definition needs to be
noted first: no mention of ‘fallacy’ is included there, although it can perhaps be easily inferred as
an offense against the “real argument.” Fallacies are, in an important sense, simply bad arguments
which are also characteristically treacherous, in that they hide their own badness (Lewiński &
Oswald, 2013; Oswald & Lewiński, 2014). As such, their treatment is, perhaps necessarily so,
parasitic on the treatment of good arguments and can never stand on its own: “There is no such
thing as a classification of the ways in which men may arrive at an error: it is much to be doubted
whether there ever can be” (De Morgan, 1847, p. 237; as cited in Hansen, 2002, p. 147; see also
Hamblin, 1970, p. 13). Whether the fallacy theory as an error theory of sorts can be conceived of
or not, the link between fallaciousness and argumentative “goodness” (deductive validity,
inductive cogency, dialectical appropriateness) cannot be easily undercut. This is clear in Hansen’s
definition of a fallacy as “an argument that appears to be a better argument of its kind than it
really is” (Hansen, 2002, p. 152, italics in original). OED’s definition of the straw man as a
“misrepresented real argument that is easier to defeat” fits in nicely here. Only that it makes the
task of understanding what a “misrepresented real argument” ever more urgent.
Before I take up this task, one final clarification is in place. Is the straw man fallacy an
“argument” in the first place? I have discussed this issue earlier (see Lewiński, 2011), and I still
think the fair solution is this: Committing the straw man fallacy can be seen as (at least) a two-step
process consisting of: (1) “setting up a straw man,” i.e., unjustifiably representing the opponent’s
conclusion or premises, and (2) “attacking a straw man,” i.e., attacking the misrepresentation as if
it were the actual conclusion or premises of the opponent. (1) does not necessarily involve an
argument. It can be a critical question, such as “How many times did you have a sexual intercourse
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with Miss Lewinsky?”, to which a proponent can respond, “I did not have sexual relations with
that woman, Miss Lewinsky; I only said I had improper physical relationship with her. Please don’t
twist my words around!” Under proper contextual circumstances, the first question—“How many
times did you…”—can be seen as a straw man that is already “set up,” but is not yet used in some
(counter-)argument or other. (2) would likely involve a complete argument (something consisting
of a conclusion and premises) in which either the conclusion or one of the premises relied on the
misrepresentation set up in (1). In particular, if the conclusion is misrepresented and then refuted
as if it were the actual conclusion of the proponent, then we can see the straw man as an important
subtype of ignoratio elenchi: the classic Aristotelian fallacy of ignoring the proper refutation
(elenchus). An opponent may even construct a sound (true and valid) argument, just not against
the conclusion the proponent defended (see Hamblin, 1970, pp. 31-32, 87-88; Hansen, 2002, pp.
144-145).
In any case, rather than being a strictly “logical” fallacy, the straw man is clearly a
dialectical fallacy occurring in argumentative discussions where something is done to the words
(meanings? thoughts?) of one’s dialectical opponent (Lewiński, 2011, 2012; Lewiński & Oswald,
2013; Oswald & Lewiński, 2014; de Saussure, 2018).
3. The semantics of the straw man: In search of “the real argument”
The fact that the OED’s definition of the straw man uses the notion of “an opponent’s real
argument” in the explanans of the term might be explained away as a necessary encyclopedic
simplification which resorts to folk terminology in order to be understood by folks. But the
argumentation scholars’ habitual use of expressions such as “the real argument” or “the real
position” when discussing the straw man (see Walton, 1996; Tindale, 2007, p. 19ff.) deserves some
additional critical scrutiny. When working on the issue of the charity of interpretation in
argumentative exchanges (Lewiński, 2012), I was urged by one of the two peer reviewers for
Informal Logic to similarly treat as a basis for any discussion of complex, even suspicious, cases,
“the real position” of an arguer, explained as what “the arguer really just means,” or “what the
arguer’s argument really is.” I never quite understood these comments, even though I still think
one can discern a mis-representation inherent in the straw man fallacy from some re-representation
that might just be fine (see also Aikin & Casey, 2011).
Consider the following examples, due to Schumann, Zufferey & Oswald (2019, pp. 10-11).
In these cases, Barbara supports a social policy change (It is crucial to better support young
parents) resorting to a prudential, economic argument (because having a child means a lot of
financial charges). Four possible reformulations of Barbara’s position put in the mouth of
Alexandre have then been analyzed by the authors:
Example 1
(1) Barbara: It is crucial to better support young parents because having a child means a lot
of financial charges.
(1a) Alexandre: Let’s raise the family allowance since having a child means financial ruin.
(1b) Alexandre: Let’s raise the family allowance since it only is about the money.
(1c) Alexandre: Let’s raise the family allowance since having a child can be a financial weight.
(1b) Alexandre: Let’s raise the family allowance since parents are under economic pressure.
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Two things are noteworthy here. First, none of Alexandre’s response uses precisely the expressions
Barbara originally uttered. Yet, one can quickly see that while (1c) and (1d) are more or less
acceptable paraphrases of Barbara’s utterance, (1a) and (1b) are some kind of misrepresentations,
and thus very strong straw man candidates. More specifically, (1a) involves an explicit
misrepresentation by means of a lexical exaggeration of the noun phrase (“financial ruin” instead
of “financial charges”), while (1b) an implicit misrepresentation by virtue of drawing a
contextually illicit pragmatic inference from her argument (a possible gloss by Alexandre: “if you
exclusively mention financial charges, that implies it’s only about the money”) (see Schumann,
Zufferey & Oswald, 2019, p. 10-11). Second, I would say—speaking exclusively for myself, not
the authors of the said study—that one can arrive at this judgment without quite knowing what
Barbara “really just meant.” Let’s even assume that in some private moment of utter sincerity, she
once said off-record that “the way things are now, it’s really just about money, young people are
so much afraid of the financial burden that they don’t have kids anymore. We need to raise the
family allowance or we’ll be a childless, aging society on its way to extinction.” Given the public
context of the debate one could argue that, confronted with Alexandre’s attack on (1b), she would
still have the perfect right to object: “Don’t twist my words around! I primarily care about the
emotional well-being of our families and the future of our country, but I cannot deny that one
problem that can be solved here and now are financial incentives.” What is her “real position”
now?
Perhaps I am just strawmanning the concept of a straw man; or rather, the concept of “the
real man,” the “actually meant real argument” of one’s opponent. So let me go carefully through
the argument, resorting to another example. Consider the following exchange between an external
candidate for a head of department at a university (A), and a search committee member (B):
Example 2
A: I think I am the right candidate for the job, I have written a number of books on the
topic.
B: Excuse me, sir, but so far as I can see you have only one book published on the topic
with you as the single or first author.
A: Well, with all due respect, please don’t twist my words around, I never said all these
books were published with me as the sole or first author. I often write with two of my
colleagues. Besides, another book is written, submitted, and accepted for publication, but
not out yet (it will be early next year). Finally, my last individual monograph is actually
written, and about to be submitted for evaluation to a very prestigious university press.
B: Why would you even mention in this context a manuscript that is not even submitted?!
We’re evaluating people based on their actual results, not imagined plans…
Again, was A’s “real argument” or “real position” that he should get a job (conclusion) because
he has “written a number of books on the topic” (premise), this including books published with
him as a second or third author, books “written” but not “published” yet, perhaps even books
“written” but waiting quietly on his hard disk for better times? Or maybe he “just meant”
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published, real books, including those merely co-authored by him, but excluding edited volumes,
books written but not published yet, short eBooks etc. Did A have any “real position” that a
reasonable dialectical opponent could and even should “interpret…as carefully and accurately as
possible” (rule 10 of pragma-dialectics, see van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992, p. 196)? In
general, can we “decide what an arguer’s real position actually is” (Tindale, 2007, p. 26), perhaps
based on the idea that “words mean what they mean” and, as such, have some kind of an “original
meaning,” as some legal scholars would claim (see Ludlow, 2014, 64ff.)?
Well, an irreverent response could be that “here as elsewhere it doesn’t make much sense
to divine what the words originally meant—the authors may not have given it any thought”
(Ludlow, 2014, p. 59). Do professors writing books have a crystal-clear grasp of what books
“really are?” It would seem not. Do institutions employing book writers—such as universities—
have a crystal-clear grasp of what books “really are?” It would seem not. Some of them might be
favorable to your promotion or tenure if you “have a book” in the sense of a prestigious edited
volume. Some not. Some would flatly dismiss an eBook openly accessible via your library’s
depository. Some would count it in. Etcetera.
Note, these are not primarily empirical arguments, although to an extent they can be. In
particular, the example above is not an empirically observed and transcribed conversation. Instead,
it is a made-up case that I invented ripping off Ludlow’s (2014) opening example of how
underdetermined the very concept of a ‘book’ is. ‘Book’ is such a basic word in English, and many
other languages, but still, as Ludlow observes, “even after a millennium of shared usage the
meaning is quite open-ended” (2014, p. 1). Because of this, in the case reported by Ludlow, his
position as a writer himself can be that he has “written two or three or six or ten books” (2014, p.
1) without any change to the facts on the ground.
This, of course, has serious consequences for how argumentative exchanges—such as the
one during a somewhat fraught job interview—develop and, indeed, what they are about. One of
the things that happen in argumentative discussions is that both speakers legitimately and quite
ordinarily modulate an underdetermined meaning—and they do so in a strategically advantageous
manner (Lewiński, 2011, 2012). Think of the book argument advanced by the aspiring department
chair. Unsurprisingly, his opponent (the bitchy committee member) would likely endorse the most
stringent meaning of a ‘book’ as a substantive text, written exclusively or primarily by a specific
author, and published by an esteemed international press. The proponent, the job candidate, could
possibly stretch the meaning to the other extreme: Why not include a collection of essays edited
by me and a colleague that is still to be sent to the publisher, and will be freely available as an
eBook in our university’s digital library? Depending on the purported meaning, the argument of
the candidate could be numerically glossed as, “hire me, I have eight books on the topic,” while
the critique of the committee member as, “I don’t think you’re a strong candidate, just one book…”
None of them would likely intentionally misrepresent some “real position” grounded in some “real
meaning” of the concept of ‘book’—just because, so the underdetermination of meaning argument
goes, there is no such real meaning. Dorr & Hawthorne’s concept of “semantic plasticity” conveys
this idea very well: “the meaning or content attributed by a particular semantic proposition belongs
to a large set of ‘candidate’ meanings or contents, all of which are roughly alike in the respects
that seem to matter for the expression relation” (2014, p. 288).
But would not all this take down the real dialectic, where arguers discuss substantive
issues, the facts on the ground, off its pedestal and into the realm of semantic quibbles and merely
verbal disputes (see Chalmers, 2011; Krabbe & van Laar, 2019)? Isn’t there simply a real book,
on whose meaning the arguers should settle before getting down to the real business of discussing
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serious issues at hand such as tenures and promotions, rather than mere words, words, words? A
real and ideal book in the Platonic sense, perhaps?
I agree that Plato is elucidating a number of important concepts and they are getting more
and more precise, but I don’t agree that this is because we are getting closer to the concepts
themselves as they rest in Plato’s heaven. I would argue that we are merely coming up with
better and better modulations—or if you prefer, we are constructing better and better
concepts. What makes them better is not that they are closer to some perfect target, but
rather that…we are coming up with progressively more serviceable modulations via a
normatively constrained process of argumentation. (Ludlow, 2014, p. 111)
This, admittedly, is an argument well-known since Quine’s thesis of the indeterminacy of meaning
and his critique of “the myth of the museum”:
Uncritical semantics is the myth of a museum in which the exhibits are meanings and the
words are labels. …Seen according to the museum myth, the words and sentences of a
language have their determinate meanings. To discover the meanings of the native’s words
we may have to observe his behavior, but still the meanings of the words are supposed to
be determinate in the native’s mind, his mental museum, even in cases where behavioral
criteria are powerless to discover them for us. When on the other hand we recognize with
Dewey that “meaning ... is primarily a property of behavior,” we recognize that there are
no meanings, nor likenesses nor distinctions of meaning, beyond what are implicit in
people’s dispositions to overt behavior. (Quine 1968, pp. 186-187)
What emerges from Quine’s critique of the “uncritical semantics” where words and sentences are
attached to fixed and determined meanings is, then, semantics which instead acknowledges an
intrinsic relationship between the way we use our words and our concepts. Our conversational
interactions—and argumentative interactions in particular—are where our dynamic and
underdetermined meanings are put to the critical test and, hopefully, become somewhat sharper.
Some kind of a conceptual clarification and resulting mutual understanding of what the other
means are thus likely the results of—not the prerequisites for—reasonable, “normatively
constrained” argumentative discussions.
Of course, critics of the strong indeterminacy thesis (Quine: there is no fact of the matter
regarding real meanings) and the weaker underdetermination thesis (Davidson, Ludlow: meanings
can be sharpened and mutually agreed on) point to the fact that communication typically is
successful, that speakers often impart their mental contents to others without great effort (Pagin,
2008). This, of course, has not escaped the attention of Quine (1960, 1968) and those after him.
The crucial point here is that our theories of meaning need to be sensitive to the possibility of
entirely legitimate processes of argumentation over meaning, recently described in some detail
under the terms of meaning negotiations, meaning litigation, metalinguistic disputes, or
conceptual engineering (Cappelen, 2018; Ludlow, 2014; Plunkett, 2015; Plunkett & Sundell 2013,
2019). Once this weaker argument is recognized, not everything that looks, walks, and talks like a
straw man turns out to be a straw man.
All the same, argumentation theorists dedicated to the study of fallacies are often bound to
the Aristotelian tradition of analyzing abuses of argumentation (see Hamblin, 1970; Hansen, 2002;
Hansen & Pinto, 1995). This is not surprising, given Aristotle’s foundational contributions to the
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study of argumentation and his historical prominence. One enduring idea is to divide fallacies into
those dependent on language (in dictione) and those outside of language (extra dictionem)
(Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations; Hamblin 1970, Chs. 2-3). Aristotle indeed provided a very
powerful catalogue of what can go wrong with the use of language in argumentative discourse,
this including the problems of ambiguity, equivocation, and vagueness, the cornerstone of the
theories of semantic underdetermination. Some even claim this is all there is to fallacies. Powers
(1995) proposes his “One Fallacy Theory” departing from precisely this assumption:
[One Fallacy Theory] insists that there is no fallacy unless there is a clearly specifiable
appearance of validity (or goodness of whatever kind). Since I believe there is no clear way
to make an argument appear to have a goodness it really lacks except by playing with
ambiguities, every real fallacy will turn out to be a fallacy of equivocation. (Powers, 1995,
p. 290)
Indeed, attention to the linguistic treacherousness of fallacies, and especially the clearly languagebased fallacies such as the straw man, is a sine qua non condition in any comprehensive treatment
of fallacies (see our arguments in Lewiński & Oswald, 2013; Oswald & Lewiński 2014). As
repeatedly noted, however (Tindale, 2007; Walton, 1996), the straw man—its Ancient Greek
structural or functional equivalent, that is—has not been among the fallacies recognized by
Aristotle. Moreover, as already mentioned, the nearest possible classical counterpart would be
ignoratio elenchi, curiously, a fallacy not based in language. As a result, Powers, who avowedly
follows Aristotle in his treatment of fallacies dependent on language, has nothing to say about the
straw man. Instead, he propounds his theory based on the following semantics of ambiguity:
All the fallacies involve playing with ambiguities. So we divide the different types of
ambiguity. A sentence is built out of words or word-parts or phrases to which meanings
are conventionally assigned. The meanings of the ultimate meaningful parts are said to be
lexically assigned. Thus in “rented” a meaning is assigned to “rent” and one to the part
“ed.” The phrase “fell off the wagon” may be understood literally in terms of its parts “fell,”
“off,” “the,” and “wagon,” or lexically as a whole receive the meaning “went back to
drinking.” The lexically meaningful parts are then put together grammatically to make up
the sentence.
If a lexical part has more than one meaning, we have a lexical ambiguity.
(Sometimes “equivocation” is used in a narrower sense than mine to cover only lexical
equivocations.) If the lexical parts are unambiguous, but it is ambiguous how the parts are
grammatically put together, we have a grammatical ambiguity, also called an amphiboly.
(Powers, 1995, p. 291)
What is the “conventionally assigned” meaning of a ‘book’? If there isn’t one, perhaps we are
constantly committing the fallacy of equivocation whenever mentioning a “book”? We can even
make this point more precise: while the notion of ‘book’ is perhaps not ambiguous, whereby two
or more determinate meanings are “conventionally assigned” to the same word (like in “bank” or
“runs”), it is nonetheless vague, in the sense that we don’t have a determinate concept in the first
place, as discussed above. Even in this case, however, it would fall under the “One Fallacy Theory”
(Powers, 1995, pp. 297-298). If we follow the arguments of the semantic underdeterminists, we
would then have a systemic implosion of the fallacy of equivocation in any use of language—and
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the corresponding shrinking of the straw man fallacy to only most blatant abuses (for then the
“error” would lie in the vague expression in the first place, not in the attacker’s misrepresentation).
How can this reductio ad absurdum be averted? One famous response is to abandon natural
language as inherently vague and turn instead to formal logic as a proper area of inquiry into
inference and argument (see Grice, 1989, for a well-known exposition and criticism of this
argument). Another, noted in passing by Powers, is to resort to semantic conventionalism (for a
recent account, see Lepore & Stone, 2015): there are socially recognized conventions that might
quite precisely determine the meaning of a given term in a specific context of use. There might
even be some kind of institutional ontology around a concept such as a ‘book’ (see Searle, 2010),
an ontology that would define what counts as a book in a given context (e.g., “a (co-)authored,
peer-reviewed scientific text of 50.000 words or more, published as an individual volume at one
of the commercial or university presses officially indexed in the Web of Science”).
Conventionalism, however, cannot account for many phenomena of rational linguistic
communication, as argued by intentionalists (e.g., Strawson, 1964; Grice, 1989; Sperber & Wilson,
1995): much of what is communicated is grounded in what speakers intend to convey, over and
above the literal, explicit meanings, via the process of pragmatic inference, notably implicatures.
Finally, one might want to resort to semantic minimalism and claim that at bottom there is a
minimal, fixed meaning, grounded in the literal meaning of non-indexical expressions, or to
semantic contextualism that would instead insist that the meaning of propositions is always
contextually-variant, open to contextually-relevant pragmatic enrichment, especially in the case of
indexicals (see Cappelen & Lepore, 2005, for a discussion).
Now, I am mentioning these obvious facts only in an encyclopedically simplified form.
But even in this form they allow me to sketch two conclusions, both of which are almost grim for
argumentation theory. First, the discipline, in its attempts to define what rational argumentative
interaction is, is bound by the principle requiring arguers to have clear and distinct definitions of
concepts ready prior to any meaningful dispute. If the speakers do not mutually agree on the
meanings and definitions of terms, they are in effect talking past each other, sinking ever deeper
in their futile misunderstandings rather than resolving worthwhile disagreements. In many
practical contexts this is, of course, a reasonable requirement: colloquially speaking, “we need to
know what we’re talking about,” so as to avoid a merely verbal dispute and instead produce some
fruitful dialectic.
However, this colloquial idea does not easily pass muster of critical scrutiny. Geach, in his
analysis of Plato’s early Socratic dialogue, Euthyphro, calls it a Socratic fallacy and insists on the
following:
Let us be clear that this is a fallacy, and nothing better. It has stimulated philosophical
enquiry, but still it is a fallacy. We know heaps of things without being able to define the
terms in which we express our knowledge. Formal definitions are only one way of
elucidating terms; a set of examples may in a given case be more useful than a formal
definition. (Geach, 1966, p. 371)
This criticism has not lost its currency today. Quite the contrary, as already discussed above, it
fuels recent discussions of meaning underdetermination and the value of metalinguistic disputes.
Among others, Plunkett & Sundell argue that “the assumption that sameness of meaning is
necessary for the expression of genuine disagreement is what leads so many theorists to ascribe
meanings to speakers that systematically diverge from those speakers’ usage and first-order
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intuitions” (2019, p. 18). That is to say, in its allegiance to the Ancient Greek principles, such as
the priority of definitions and determination of meanings, the discipline might be committing a
fallacy itself.
This brings me to the second grim point: even assuming that these principles are
defensible—in many ordinary contexts they perhaps even are—argumentation theory has not
produced its clear position on how the allegedly fixed and definable meanings can actually be
fixed: by linguistic conventions alone, by speakers’ intentions, by contextual features, by the
circumstances of evaluation, etcetera, etcetera. As a result, when discussing the straw man and
other fallacies of language, the discipline resorts to textbook quality explanations and folk concepts
such as “what the arguer really just means.” In this way—involuntarily, one would hope—it
produces its baby semantics for absolute beginners. This raises the suspicion that argumentation
theory is a biblia pauperum of sorts, a largely pedagogical discipline meant to translate the
complexities of logic and the philosophy of language to “dummies” interested in everyday
argumentation.
Now, in all fairness, when it comes to the straw man fallacy argumentation scholars are
aware of the fact that concepts such as “the real argument,” “the real position,” or “the standpoint
actually advanced” are idealizations that might not necessarily work well in actual discussions. i
However, for ease of exposition (that’s my best guess), they still discuss the puzzles involved
parenthetically—and, in any case, treat them as practical problems of implementation rather than
theoretical issues in semantics that need to be, one way or another, addressed.
One final remark before getting out of the dark: here, I focus exclusively on the semantics
of the straw man fallacy, while, together with Steve Oswald, I treated its pragmatics in other work
(esp. Lewiński, 2011; Lewiński & Oswald, 2013; Oswald & Lewiński, 2014). Thanks in part to
the pragmatic theories of argumentation, such as pragma-dialectics (see esp. van Eemeren,
Grootendorst, Jackson & Jacobs, 1993), the pragmatic phenomena of argumentative exchanges
have received closer attention. This attention has recently turned into a serious empirical program
of investigating the linguistic and pragmatic details of various forms of possible straw man (see de
Saussure, 2018; Schumann, Zufferey & Oswald, 2019; Müller, 2020).
4. The dialectic of the straw man
The discussion in the previous section lets me also formulate the guiding principle for this section,
namely: playing on the meaning of words or phrases is not necessarily a straw man. It might instead
be a necessary, indeed valuable, contribution to a collective conceptual refinement of vague,
ambiguous, unclear, or otherwise underdetermined terms.
Above, I already suggested what the possible relation between the concept of open-ended,
underdetermined meanings and an argumentative discussion can be. Part and parcel of an
argumentative exchange in natural language would not only be an argumentative contest over the
“facts on the ground” but also a dispute over the meaning of the words used. These two aspects—
traditionally dichotomized into, respectively, substantive and verbal disputes—have intricate
relations that are yet to be fully appreciated (see Balcerak Jackson, 2014; Chalmers, 2011;
Plunkett, 2015; Plunkett & Sundell, 2013, 2019; Rott, 2015; Vermeulen, 2018, for some of the
recent contributions to the debate). The meaning is, of course, consequential for how a given
position can be defended and objected to—it would be utterly surprising, then, if arguers were not
attentive to this element in their discussions. How can this process be grasped in terms of
argumentation?
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To start with, I will assume an adversarial view on argumentative discussions, not unlike
the classic Socratic elenchus referred to above, or its contemporary rendering in pragma-dialectics
(see Lewiński, 2011, 2012, 2017, for a detailed defense). Arguers are out to defend their position
on an issue and have it accepted by their critics. To this end, they go through an agonistic process
of advancing arguments, asking critical questions, providing counterarguments, etc. This process,
while agonistic and thus likely strategic, is also inherently cooperative: for the whole process to
be reasonable and simply meaningful, arguers need to follow some basic rules, such as those
defining relevant types of speech acts, acceptable inferences (formal and informal), possible
responses to an opponent’s contributions, and commitments that arguers are bound to undertake
or retract, as needed (see Hamblin, 1970). It is, shortly, both a normative and a strategic endeavor
(see van Eemeren, 2010).
Now, whenever some term—such as “book”—is underdetermined it will characteristically
have various plausible interpretations (“modulations,” in Ludlow’s, 2014, parlance), some of them
benefitting one arguer, and others her opponent. Let’s return to our job interview and the book
argument. As already described, the job candidate would most likely stretch the concept of ‘book’
to its widest possible extension, including edited books, eBooks, and written manuscripts, even
those still under review. By contrast, the uncharitable committee member would likely say
something like, “Let’s be professional about it, this is a professional context, right? For me a ‘book’
is, I quote, ‘a (co-)authored, peer-reviewed scientific text of 50.000 words or more, published as
an individual volume at one of the commercial or university presses officially indexed in the Web
of Science.’ You have merely one of those, and I hope I’ll die in a ditch before we have a
department chair like that.” The job candidate can then respond, “That’s just like, your opinion,
man… I quote from the APA’s recent rulebook where a book means ‘a substantive text written or
edited by a scholar, and published through traditional or digital channels, or considered for such
publication.’ I have eight of those, you won’t get a better hire!” Importantly, throughout this
process, neither of them is misrepresenting the (real?) concept of ‘book,’ but rather modulating it
to his or her own dialectical advantage. And, as long as their arguments are reasonable—those
above probably are—they are not only not committing a straw man (nor any other fallacy of
language described by Powers, 1995), but rather engaging in a strategically understandable and,
potentially, conceptually fruitful elenchus over the meaning in question.ii
Yet, one cannot deny that straw men do happen: Aikin & Casey (2011, 2016) are surely
right about that. My argument so far has been limited to underdetermined terms—but many would
argue this pertains to virtually all our vocabulary (“What exactly does ‘3 o’clock’ mean?” see
Ludlow, 2014), or at least to the most important part of it (“Is waterboarding ‘torture’?” see
Plunkett & Sundell, 2013, 2019), or least to the most esteemed and famous part of the most
important part (“Is our will ‘free’?” see Chalmers, 2011). Still, let’s bar meaning
underdetermination for a second as philosophers’ gibberish. Here’s a semantic straw man:
Example 3
A: I won’t go there again. The food was pretty bland, and expensive for that.
B: Well, no, I myself didn’t find it inedible. And the company paid, so what’s the problem?
‘Bland’ and ‘inedible’ cannot easily be modulated so as to be one and the same concept—all the
troubles regarding the predicates of personal taste notwithstanding (see Stojanovic, 2007). So we
clearly have a straw man here. But real examples—I again invented this one—are hardly ever so
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simple. Meticulous analyses of actual cases (see Lewiński, 2011; Lewiński & Oswald, 2013;
Oswald & Lewiński, 2014) reveal that much of the difficulty rests in the pragmatic aspect of
natural language: strawmanners may astutely manipulate various types of pragmatic inference in
order to cover up and get away with the abuse. Here, as already mentioned, I limit myself to the
semantic issues—all the troubles regarding the semantics-pragmatics distinction notwithstanding,
again (see Plunkett & Sundell, 2019, for a discussion in the context of metalinguistic negotiations).
In any case, the dialectical discussion over meanings should be governed by “a normatively
constrained process of argumentation” (Ludlow, 2014, p. 111). For Ludlow, this process is
primarily grounded in analogical argumentation: one would argue analogically from undisputed,
canonical cases, thus tracking the important properties of the term as applied in the new context of
the current dispute. Importantly, much has to do with the contextual conditions of the debate: the
question of whether a ‘fetus’ is a ‘person’ can lead to a very different answer in the strictly legal,
strictly medical, or strictly religious context. That is, different arguments from analogy would be
deemed reasonable in various context of an argumentative discussion over meanings.
Table 1
Contextual precision and charity of interpretation

Highly critical
(uncharitable)
Constructive (charitable)

Precise interpretation
Criminal trial, blind academic
review, job interview?
Doctor-patient consultation,
classroom discussion,
conference presentation?

Loose interpretation
Political debates
Small friendly talk,
family dinner table

In my earlier work (see Lewiński, 2011, 2012; Lewiński & Oswald, 2013), I have
advocated similar contextual conditions for what I have called an intersubjective interpretation
procedure. When in dispute over the meaning of their expressions—which can be triggered by the
straw man attempts or straw man accusations—arguers need to abide by two crisscrossing criteria
of interpretation: the precision required by the context at hand and the charity of interpretation.
The resulting simple matrix of four options is presented in Table 1.
In the first place, various forms of institutionalized activities offer precise rules of
interpretation of discourse. Legal discourse is a paradigmatic example here—but so is any
specialized context, including perhaps a job interview at a university, where a ‘book’ can mean a
specific type of scholarly publication, rather than just any longer written text. Other contexts in
the private or public sphere may allow for more laxity in meaning, thereby making a meaning
dispute ever more likely and the straw man ever more unlikely. In the second place, one can
distinguish between charitable (constructive) and uncharitable (critical) argumentative contexts. A
certain expectation of constructive or critical engagement affects the contextually appropriate level
of meaning nit-pickiness. Compare an argument over an experiment in a high-school chemistry
class with cross-examination in a criminal trial: while similar levels of precision might be required
in both contexts, the classroom discussion calls for the interpretive benefit of the doubt, when
necessary, at least on the part of the teacher. As a result, in the classroom context attacks on
interpretations which are plausible, but less than charitable, can be seen as attacks on straw men,
whereas they would be seen as tough but overall reasonable criticisms in the legal context. As for
our job interview: there doesn’t seem to exist any firm convention regarding the levels of necessary

11

charity, but an interrogative, even bitchy, critical attitude of the committee members seem to be
one recognizable option for a job interview. Similarly for the precision of rules of interpretation:
there might be institutional regulations defining what counts as a ‘book’, or ‘an academic
publication’ at large, and in this case arguers should in principle be bound by them. Only “in
principle,” however, because descriptive metalinguistic disputes, with arguments resorting to how
a term actually is used by some authority, institution, or by custom, do not preclude normative
metalinguistic disputes, where arguments turn on how a term ought to be used, even despite the
currently accepted, prevalent, or even mandated meaning (Plunkett, 2015; Plunkett & Sundell,
2013, 2019).
To sum up, arguers should conduct their argumentative discussions with these general rules
in mind. Depending on the contextual conditions, meaning disputes will be more or less open to
arguers’ modulating the meaning of the words, and, respectively, less or more rigid when it comes
to the straw man identification.
5. Conclusion: Toward meaning argumentativism
Before reaching an optimistic conclusion, let me first summarize the argument of the entire paper
in three sentences. In order to identify the straw man fallacy, we need to have some idea of how to
adjudicate between the meaning of the original arguments and the meanings attributed in the
alleged straw man attack. There are various ways of solving this semantic predicament: we can
rely on the intention of the original arguer (“No, no, don’t twist my words around, I meant…”), on
some governing convention (“At our university “x” means ‘x’”), on mutual agreement between
speakers (“For the current purposes, let us define “x” as ‘x’”), etc. And while none of these
solutions is fully satisfactory—by virtue of each of them being unreflectively tied to spurious
assumptions regarding the determination of meaning—one possible idea is to resort to the
contextual criteria of precision and constructiveness of linguistic usage and vary our fallacy
judgements accordingly.
The optimistic conclusion is that whereas argumentation theory has not been capable of
producing or even resorting to some defensible theory of meaning, it can find a solution in its own
midst. The varied contextual criteria proposed above allow us to undermine the dubious
assumptions about meaning and come up with a less-than-grim solution. I will call this solution
meaning argumentativism. In a sense, it has been argued for all along this chapter through my
critical arguments and the analyses of examples; yet, I surely haven’t been able to express it in so
few a word Donald Davidson did when he spoke about “the cooperative reworking of verbal usage
that occurs in dialectical exchange” (1994, p. 435). Analyzing Plato’s Euthyphro—the exact same
dialogue that led Geach to identify the Socratic fallacy—Davidson declares the he sees “the
Socratic elenchus as a crucible in which some of our most important words, and the concepts they
express, are tested, melted down, reshaped, and given a new edge” (1994, p. 435):
As they try to understand each other, people in open discussion use the same words, but
whether they mean the same things by those words, or mean anything clear at all, only the
process of question and answer can reveal. …If it attains its purpose, an elenctic discussion
is an event in which the meanings of words, the concepts entertained by the speakers,
evolve and are clarified. In this respect it is a model of every successful attempt at
communication. (Davidson, 1994, p. 432)
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This is more than little praise for the role of argumentation in our communication. But it’s also an
indictment and a challenge to abandon the baby semantics of “the real argument” and engage in
serious reconsideration of the functions of argumentative discussions. Instead of being a sine qua
non condition for meaningful argumentative discussions, semantic clarification and refinement is
their result, and often a precious one. As I have argued, the analysis of one single fallacy, the straw
man, can be a good point of entry into such reconsideration. Yes, it will likely make the straw man
a concept more obscure than our students need, but it can also lead us to a better understanding of
what argumentation, and argumentation theory, is about.
i

To give but two, but prominent and quite representative, examples:
“In practice, the differences between the attacked standpoint and the original standpoint will often be quite subtle. By
design, the opponent’s words are so twisted that it becomes at the same time easy for the distorter to tackle and difficult
for an outsider to tell whether justice is being done to the original standpoint.” (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992,
pp. 127–128).
“Because of the various kinds of problems and trickiness in determining what an arguer’s position really is in a given
case, it can be easy to get this wrong, and to mistake an arguer’s real position for something else that is not her real
position, but only appears to be. This is the essence of the deception or error inherent in the straw man fallacy as a
distinctive type of sophistical tactic. […] It is important to realize that the job of determining what an arguer’s
commitments really are, or may fairly be taken to be, in a real case, is by no means trivial” (Walton, 1996, pp. 125126).
ii
However, there is a difference between attributing to the protagonist a meaning that patently misrepresents the
meaning he intended, and signaled as intended, and advancing a reasonable metalinguistic argument. Compare the
committee member’s retort, “Well, if any written text is a ‘book’ to you, I have written about 237 of them!”, with, “I
see what you’re trying to say, but at our university ‘books’ are only published books, period.” While in both cases the
protagonist (the job candidate) can claim to “own” the meaning or at least have some meaning precedence, only in the
former case could he justifiably issue a straw man accusation (“Don’t twist my words around!”). As a consequence,
assuming both retorts of the committee member are metalinguistic arguments, meaning disputes can still include
moves which commit a straw man fallacy. (Thank you to Steve Oswald for pointing this out!)
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